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Sharing financial risk through flexible farm lease agreements
Abstract
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree
of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases.
Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included
standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that
included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and
reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 percent.
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Sharing Financial Risk through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements
By William M. Edwards & Chad E. Hart
IntroductionFor several decades an increasing number of farm leases in the 
north central region of the U.S. have called for a fixed cash rent payment instead of sharing crop production and input costs between the tenant and the landowner (Duffy et al, 2008). 
This has resulted in a significant transfer of financial risk from landowners to tenants over time.
Cash rents are usually negotiated directly between tenants and owners, or with the intervention of a professional farm manager, 
trustee, or other agent. It is common for rental rates to be fixed for only a year at a time, even when lease agreements continue between the same parties for many years. Rates are usually negotiated before the new lease year begins, sometimes as much 
as six months in advance.  In times of stable economic conditions this may not present a major problem, but when commodity prices and input costs are in a period of high volatility, arriving at 
a rental rate that will be consistent with the profit levels realized 
from the next crop can be difficult.
ABSTRACT
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the 
degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 
10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices, and production costs 
were incorporated. Measures of risk 
included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile 
value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all 
three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant’s probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 percent.
William M. Edwards and Chad E. Hart are professor and associate professor of 
economics, respectively, at Iowa State University.
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Flexible Cash Leases
An intermediate alternative between a fixed cash 
rent lease and a crop share lease is a flexible (or 
variable) lease. A flexible lease determines the cash rent by a formula that includes variables for which 
values are not known until near the end of the lease 
period. The relevant variables affect the profitability of the crops grown on the rented land during the production cycle covered by the lease period. 
Setting the rent by a formula ensures that the final rent is commensurate with the potential returns the 
tenant earns during that cycle. An additional benefit is that once an acceptable formula is agreed on, the level of rent is determined automatically each year. The tenant and owner or manager do not have to renegotiate it annually, based solely on forecasts.
The use of flexible cash leases appears to be increasing in the Corn Belt.  Data collected in a survey of farmland tenure arrangements in Iowa in 1993 showed that 3.5 percent of the cash leases 
had flexible provisions (Edwards, 1993).  A similar survey in 2003 showed that 11 percent of the cash 
leases had flexible provisions (Duffy et al., 2003); a 2007 survey showed 12 percent (Duffy et al., 2008). A 1999 research project in Ohio revealed that eight percent of the cash leases in that state had some 
flexible provisions (Fleming & Breece, 2008). A 2012 survey of professional farm managers in Illinois showed that variable leases accounted for 17 percent of all lease arrangements under their management, and 32 percent of the cash leases 
were variable (Schnitkey, 2012).
Many variations of flexible cash leases are in use 
today (Lemmons, 2011). They can be classified according to the variables included in the formula 
used to determine the final rent. The most common 
types flex on (1) yield only; (2) price only; (3) both 
price and yield; and (4) price, yield, and costs of production. Table 1 shows the relative frequencies 
of the first three types, as reported in the Iowa and Illinois surveys cited earlier. Neither survey 
included flexible leases that adjusted for changes in production costs. The more variables included 
in the rent formula, the closer the flexible lease 
comes to sharing risk in the same manner as a traditional crop share lease. At the same time, the 
formula becomes more complex and requires more information to be implemented. The variables 
which present the greatest source of risk depends on the crops produced, the geographic location of the land being rented, and the current supply and demand conditions for each crop. Interactions and correlations between prices and yields of individual crops, among different crops, and among crop 
prices and prices of inputs make the assessment 
of how overall risk is shared under any particular 
lease arrangement complex.
The Current ResearchThe objective of the current research project was to 
compare how the risks of uncertain yields, prices, and input costs were shared between tenants and 
landowners under ten different models of flexible 
cash leases, using a fixed cash rent agreement as a 
benchmark. Davis carried out a similar analysis for 
South Carolina farms producing six different crops, 
but analyzed only three types of flexible leases, those with a price adjustment, a yield adjustment, 
and a price times yield adjustment (Davis, 2004).
A similar study from Illinois compared the standard deviation and probability of a positive net farm 
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income to the tenant under a fixed cash lease, a crop 
share lease, and flexible leases adjusted by a price 
index, a yield index, and a combined price and yield 
index (Muzinga, Lins, and Boehlje, 1997).
The ten types of flexible leases chosen are described in Table 2 and are grouped according to which variables are included in each rent formula. 
The degree of risk borne by each party under a traditional crop-share agreement (crop production 
and costs for seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and grain drying are shared equally) and under a custom farming agreement (landowner pays all input 
costs and a fixed fee to the custom operator and receives all the crop) was also estimated to provide comparisons.
Results were generated for two crops – corn and soybeans – each assumed to be grown on half of 
the rented acres. Table 3 summarizes the other parameter values used in the analysis. These values were generally representative of yield potential, 
market conditions, and input costs in the U.S. Corn 
Belt at the time of the study. However, it is expected 
that the estimated degree of risk sharing among the various lease types will generally hold true over a wide range of yield, price and cost values.
Description of Methodology
To examine the risk sharing relationship, values for yields, prices, and costs were modeled within a Monte Carlo simulation. There were eight random variables in the analysis: corn and soybean 
prices; corn and soybean yields; corn and soybean 
machinery costs; and the sum of corn and soybean 
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, insurance, interest, and miscellaneous costs. The prices and costs were 
assumed to have lognormal distributions, whereas the crop yields were assumed to follow beta distributions.
The values for the beta distribution parameters were chosen so as to be consistent with the Yield Protection (YP) crop insurance rates for corn and soybeans at the 65 percent coverage level for Story County, Iowa, in 2012. The YP rates were obtained 
from the Risk Management Agency’s Actuarial Data Master database. The price and cost means were set at the values outlined in Table 3. The standard 
deviations of prices and costs were defined as the product of the mean and the implied volatility from 
“at the money” options on the first trading day in September 2011.
A method for imposing correlations first proposed 
in 1982 (Iman & Conover, 1982) was implemented. The procedure is open-ended and can be imposed on any combination of densities. The method is fully transparent since the only manipulation to the original marginal probability draws is a resorting of the draws. The means and standard deviations of the price, cost, and yield distributions are not affected by the procedure. For this analysis, target 
rank correlations were derived from historical data. The Monte Carlo analysis consisted of 5,000 draws based on the parameter values in Table 3.
The terms of the various flexible rent agreements that were compared are representative of those 
reported in a recent Iowa survey (Edwards, 2008). Their values were deliberately set so that the mean cash rent paid under each type of lease was nearly 
equal to the fixed cash rent assumed. That was done so that attention could be focused on the differences 
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in risk sharing between the parties rather than 
profit sharing.
Results of the SimulationThe 5,000 simulated values for yields, prices, and 
input costs were substituted into each flexible 
rent formula and the three benchmark agreement 
formulas. The standard deviations of profit per 
acre for each party that resulted are summarized in 
Table 4. The standard deviation for the overall profit 
per acre, i.e., the tenant’s and landowner’s profits 
combined, was $385.  A standardized value was calculated by dividing the tenant’s and landowner’s 
profit standard deviations for each type of lease 
agreement by this value. These standardized 
percentages are also shown in Table 4 and in Figure 1. 
Note that in the simulations a negative correlation between yield and price for both corn and soybeans was assumed. Furthermore, a positive correlation between corn/soybean prices and the variable input 
costs was assumed, which reflected the impact of variations in energy prices on both of them. Under a 
fixed cash rent agreement, both of these correlations 
tend to reduce the overall variability of profit for the tenant, i.e., when yields are down, prices are up, and when prices are down, inputs costs are also lower. However, as the impacts of variable yields, prices, and costs are shifted between the tenant and landowner, the offsetting effects of the correlations do not always accrue to the same party, causing the sum of the standard deviations of the tenant and 
landlord to exceed the standard deviation of overall 
profit under a fixed cash rent lease.
Price and Yield Risk
The first two types of flexible leases tested, where 
the rent is equal to a fixed charge per bushel of 
actual yield realized (Type 1) or to a base rent 
value times the ratio of the actual yield to a fixed 
base yield (Type 2), had almost exactly the same standard deviations. This is because for both of them the rent paid varies according to the actual yield only. However, the tenant’s standard deviation 
in profit was reduced by only three percent, while 
the landlord’s profits now had a standard deviation equal to twelve percent of the overall value. Due to the assumed negative correlations between crop yields and prices, in many years the adjustment made to cash rent based on the yield variation was larger than the variation in gross income, so these 
lease types did not do much to stabilize the tenant’s 
profits while they increased the variability of the 
landowner’s profits.
Lease Type 3 sets the rent equal to the actual selling 
prices of corn and soybeans each year times a fixed 
number of bushels of each crop, and Type 4 sets the rent equal to a base rent value times the ratio of 
each year’s actual selling price to a fixed base price. Both lease types varied the rent according to actual prices only, and gave nearly identical standard 
deviations. However, because prices were expected to vary more than yields, based on the data used in the study, considerably more of the variability 
in profit was shifted to the landowner than under Types 1 and 2.  The tenant’s standard deviation 
decreased to 74 percent of the total profit standard deviation (Figure 1), while the landowner’s standard deviation rose to above 30 percent of the overall level.
2013 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
158
Gross Revenue Risk
From an economic point of view, profits depend more directly on the product of price and yield each year than on either price or yield alone.  Thus, the 
Type 5 lease sets the cash rent as a fixed percent of gross revenue (actual price times actual yield). The 
fixed percentages of gross revenue used to calculate the rent were 29 percent and 35 percent for corn 
and soybeans, respectively, approximately equal to the ratio of cash rent to gross crop value observed 
in Iowa in recent years (Edwards & Johanns, 
2012). The Type 5 lease reduced the tenant’s profit standard deviation more than any of the previously discussed leases, to only two-thirds of the overall 
standard deviation of profit (Figure 1). Conversely, 
the landowner’s profit standard deviation was equal to a third of the overall standard deviation.
Lease Type 7, under which the rent is set equal to a 
fixed base rent times both the ratio of actual yield to a base yield and the ratio of actual price to a base price, gave nearly the same results as Type 5.  This result was similar to that observed in Davis’ study, 
where a flexible lease with both a yield and price 
index adjustment reduced the standard deviation of the tenant’s net return more than leases with a 
yield or price index adjustment only (Davis, 2004). Similar results were also reported by the Illinois study, which projected that the standard deviation of a tenant’s net farm income would be reduced 
more by leases flexing on price or gross income than 
on yield only (Muzinga, Lins and Boehlje, 1997).
Lease Type 6 is the same as Type 5 except both a 
minimum ($150) and a maximum ($400) annual rent are imposed. This actually increased the standard 
deviation of the tenant’s profits substantially. In years of very low gross income the tenant must still pay the minimum rent, whereas under Type 5 a lower rent would be due. This accentuates losses in 
a “bad” year. Just the opposite takes place in a high gross income year. The tenant never pays more than 
the maximum rent, so enjoys even higher profits in 
an extraordinarily good year.  Both of these cases 
increased the variability of the tenant’s profits and 
decreased the variability of the landowner’s profits.
Lease Type 8 sets the rent equal to a base value, then adds a bonus if the gross revenue each year is 
greater than a fixed value. The base gross revenue values were set equal to the projected gross 
revenue for each crop using the expected yields 
and selling prices, $845 per acre for corn and $600 per acre for soybeans. The bonus is equal to half of the amount by which the actual gross revenue 
exceeds the projected gross revenue, i.e., the tenant 
and landowner divide equally any “extra” revenue. There are no negative bonuses, so the base rent is also the minimum rent. Because the landowner 
is not bearing any downside risk in the event that 
gross revenue is lower than expected, the base rent 
was set at a lower level than the fixed cash rent.  In this case it was at $150 per acre, the same as the minimum rent under lease Type 6. The base rent plus bonus lease had a slightly lower standard deviation for the tenant than the percent of gross revenue leases (Types 5 and 7), at only 65 percent 
of the overall profit standard deviation. The 
landowner’s profit standard deviation was higher than for the previous types, but most of the added variation was on the up side rather than the down side, due to the imposition of a minimum rent.
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Cost of Production RiskRecent large swings in the costs of some crop 
production inputs, most notably nitrogen fertilizer, have caused tenants to consider incorporating 
production cost risk factors into flexible leases. 
Lease Type 9 is the same as Type 8 except the base gross revenue is set equal to the tenant’s costs of production each year for each crop. Costs include 
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and other input costs; 
machinery and drying costs; labor cost; and the base 
rent amount. If the actual gross revenue exceeds the base gross revenue (total costs), 50 percent 
of the excess revenue is added to the cash rent.  If the actual gross revenue is below the base value, the rent is not lowered. Thus, the lease is actually 
a “profit sharing” agreement. Because the expected 
costs of production are lower than the expected gross revenue used as the base revenue in Type 8, 
the expected bonus in Type 9 is larger. To offset this, the base rent was reduced from $150 in Type 8 to $100 in Type 9.
In the simulation, only variability of production 
costs related to energy prices was taken into account. Separate distributions were estimated 
for the sum of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and drying costs, and for machinery costs (fuel). The tenant’s 
standard deviation of profit for lease Type 9 was only 56 percent of the overall standard deviation, compared to 65 percent under Type 8. Introducing 
cost of production risk into the rent equation 
shifted more of the profit variation from the tenant to the landowner, and approached the nearly equal 
sharing of risk observed under a 50-50 crop share lease.
The last flexible lease type, Type 10, is similar to Type 
7, but in addition to a yield index and a price index it 
contains a cost of production index adjustment. The 
index is equal to the projected cost of production for 
each crop (excluding rent) divided by the tenant’s actual cost of production each year. Note that it is inverted from the yield and price indices, so that the rent is increased when actual costs are below 
expected levels and decreased when actual costs 
exceed expected levels. The standard deviation of 
profit for the tenant under this lease type was lower 
than the price index lease (Type 4), but actually 
higher than for the yield and price index lease 
(Type 7).  This can be explained by the assumed positive correlation of production costs with grain 
prices.  In today’s markets, energy prices affect the cost of crop inputs, but also impact crop selling prices, especially corn. Thus, in years when the 
tenant’s profits were high due to high selling prices, production costs were also high. Incorporating production costs into the rent formula reduced the rent paid in those years and made the tenant’s 
profits even higher, while the opposite occurred in low price years. This had the effect of increasing the 
tenant’s profit standard deviation (Figure 1).
Downside Risk
One drawback of comparing the standard deviations 
of profit under the various lease types is that above 
average profits are treated the same as below 
average profits. In reality, only years with below 
average profits pose a financial risk to the tenant or to the landowner, particularly those years in which revenue is below total costs. Figure 2 shows the 
probability of the tenant incurring a negative profit (economic loss) under each lease type, using the assumed values in Table 3 and the simulation results 
2013 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
160
described earlier. For example, the probability of a 
loss under a fixed cash lease was 51 percent.
Incorporating yield variability into the rent formula (Types 1 and 2) had little effect on the probability of a loss for the tenant, while incorporating price 
variability (Types 3 and 4) reduced it some, and incorporating both price and yield variability 
(Types 5, 6 and 7) reduced it even more, to about 45 percent. Shifting to a base rent plus a bonus (Type 8) 
further reduced the chances of a loss to 41 percent, 
and basing the bonus on revenue earned in excess of production costs (Type 9) lowered the odds to only 37 percent, actually lower than the probability of a loss under a 50-50 crop share lease (39%). Reducing the minimum cash rent to $150 and $100 for Types 8 and 9, respectively, helped turn some of 
the loss years into profitable years for the tenant.
Value at Risk
Another way to look at the effect of the terms of the 
lease on the tenant’s financial risk is to look at the 
projected value for profit at the tenth percentile of 
the whole profit distribution. In other words, what 
is the value that profit will exceed 90 percent of the time and be less than 10 percent of the time? This 
is commonly called “value at risk.” A similar value at 
risk could be calculated for other percentile points 
of the profit distribution. For example, the fiftieth 
percentile value at risk would indicate the level 
where half the time profits are higher and half the 
time profits are lower.
Table 5 summarizes the tenth percentile value at 
risk for the tenant and the landowner for each type 
of lease. Higher profits or smaller losses indicate 
less financial risk. Not surprisingly, the tenant’s 
projected profit in the ninth worst year out of 10 
was negative under all the agreements except the custom farming. The landowner, on the other hand, 
showed a positive profit under all the cash rent alternatives. The owner’s costs were assumed to be 
only $40 per acre for real estate taxes and upkeep, however, and did not include any debt servicing or 
returns to equity capital. The profits accruing to the tenant and the landowner should not be compared directly to each other, because the two parties are contributing quite different resources to the agreement.
The lease types that incorporate both prices and yields into the rent formulas (Types 5, 7, 9, and 10) had the smallest losses for the tenant in the ninth worst year out of ten. On the other hand, Type 6 and Type 8, which both called for a minimum rent of $150, resulted in larger losses for the tenant in years of low gross revenue. Type 9 had a minimum rent of only $100, and Types 5, 7, and 10 had no minimum rents, which decreased the chances of a large loss.
Of course less risk for the tenant leads to more risk for the landowner, as can be seen in the second column of Table 5. The lowest estimated 10 percent 
values at risk for the landowner were for the leases 
that had no minimum rent (Types 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10), and were in the range of $60 to $65 for each one. 
The crop share lease about broke even at the tenth percentile, and the custom farming agreement projected a loss of $128 per acre for the landowner.
Summary
Flexible cash leases are an effective way to share 
yield, price, and cost risks between farm tenants 
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and landowners while preserving the traditional 
operational aspects of a fixed cash rent lease. Under simulated conditions for corn and soybean production in the U.S. Corn Belt, leases that adjusted 
for only yield variability shifted very little risk from tenant to landowner. Leases that incorporated 
price variability shifted more risk, and leases that 
included both price and yield risk factors shifted 
even more risk. A lease that called for a base rent 
plus a bonus based on how much revenue exceeded 
costs of production each year shifted the most risk, and provided the tenant with the lowest probability of suffering a loss in any given year.
The terms of the leases in this study were set so that 
all of them would return approximately the same 
level of profit to the tenant and landowner.  However, 
reducing financial risk for the tenant necessarily 
means increasing financial risk for the landowner. 
Flexible leases allow landowners to capture higher returns when crop revenues are strong and help maintain tenant returns when crop revenues 
are weak. In order for the landowner to accept 
additional risk, the terms may have to be adjusted 
so that the expected profit to the landowner is also increased. This study highlights the relative amount 
of risk shared between landowners and tenants under various rental arrangements, holding average returns constant. Further research needs to be 
done to determine the magnitude of the risk/return trade off under typical farm leasing conditions.
Several decision tools are available to help tenants, 
landowners and farm managers analyze the 
potential results from various types of flexible lease agreements under different yield, price and cost 
expectations. A partial list is as follows:
1)  Flexible Lease Agreement Worksheet from 
Iowa State University Extension and Outreach 
(http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/
wholefarm/xls/c2-21flexiblerentanalysis.xls)
2)  FlexRent from Kansas State University Research 
and Extension (http://www.agmanager.info/
farmmgt/land/lease/tools/FlexRent.xls)
3)  Cash Rent with Bonus Worksheet from University of Illinois Fast Tools: (http://www.
farmdoc.illinois.edu/fasttools/index.asp) 
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